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ABSTRACT 
THE NEW VEIL: 
A FUNDAMENTALLY MODERN PHENOMENON 
By 
Hassan Adnan Mortada 
 
Advisor: Professor Devrim Yavuz 
 
 The present thesis is a study of the New Veil movement in the Middle East 
and in France. The aim of this thesis is to examine the definition of this movement and its 
origins focusing on its modern re-emergence. The importance of this issue comes with 
the rise of nationalism and right wing policies that affected women in general and Veiled 
Muslim women in particular.  
 Is it possible that certain restrictive attempts at controlling the day-to-day 
particulars of religious life have backfired, creating the opposite of their desire effect? 
What is it about in the dynamics of the state and, on a larger scale, of the global order that 
generates Fundamentalism?   
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INTRODUCTION 
 On March 15, 2004, France enacted a law on religious symbols that would 
extend the country's longstanding policy of secularism in public schools. Passing with 
massive support from the French National Assembly, the law required schools to enforce 
a number of curricular and behavioral policies in line with the secular republican ethic, 
from harsh restrictions on the display of religious symbols to the controversial mandate 
that only scientifically verifiable facts be taught in science classes. The measure drew 
major scrutiny on July 17
th
 2009, when six cases of students being removed from school 
for wearing religious talismans were dismissed by the chamber court of the human rights. 
(Aktas v. France, Bayrak v. France, Gamaleddyn v. France, Ghazal v. France, J. Singh v. 
France, and R. Singh v. France) Five out of the six cases involved French nationals, and 
four involved Muslims while the remaining two concerned Sikhs. The four Muslims were 
female and the two Sikhs were men. The girls, Miss Aktas, Miss Bayrak, Miss 
Gamaleddyn, and Miss Ghazal wore headscarves on the first day of school, violating the 
aforementioned French law of 2004, which prohibits wearing any religious clothing or 
symbols in French public schools. In a press release issued after the incident, the school 
made clear its intentions in removing the girls, stating that they were turned away by the 
headmasters for refusing to remove their so-called ‗offensive‘ headwear. Forced to 
compromise, the young women wore hats instead of their traditional headscarves. In its 
description of the case, the court's press release never mentioned specifically why exactly 
the headscarves were so offensive, skirting around the topic despite its centrality to the 
logic of the court's decision. Interestingly, it goes into adequate detail describing the 
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Sikh‘s keski, using the correct terminology, as ―smaller than the traditional turban and 
dark in color,‖ but does not ever use term hijab for the young women‘s attire. Throughout 
the press release in fact, the hijab is referred to as headwear or headgear rather than being 
described in the specific terms. The language that the court used is emblematic of 
Muslims' strained relationship with the French state and other governments like it. 
 The complaints, which were dismissed by the applicants, revolved around the 
issues of freedom of thought, conscience and religion (Article 9) and prohibition of 
discrimination (Article 14). The other complaints involved the right to a fair hearing 
within a reasonable time, the right to education and double jeopardy, although the right to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion played the primary role in this case. 
According to the European Court, the French law passed in 2004 was supposed to protect 
the rights and freedoms of others and the ―public order‖, and while the courts were 
staunchly defending the public order, they were doing so at the expense of certain 
individual‘s freedom of thought. However, because the law is so geared towards this 
notion of a secular public space, restriction of religious dress is fully in line with its core 
principles. To make matters worse, the court then went on to use the French Law of 2004 
as a means of backing up the complaints, defending the young women's expulsion from 
school property. In the court's opinion, the expulsion of the Muslim students was all for 
the greater purpose of ‗protecting‘ the freedom of the other students and safeguarding 
‗the public order.‘  1 
 Predictably, the court eventually ruled in favor of protecting secularism, and the 
court's press release portrays the Muslim women in involved in a noticeably 
                                                        
1
 Aktas v. France, Bayrak v. France, Gamaleddyn v. France, Ghazal v. 
France, J. Singh v. France and R. Singh v. France (30 June 2009). 
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unsympathetic light. It bears mentioning that this case is not the first of its kind in France. 
One of the first cases of this nature was introduced to the French court in 1989, triggering 
public outrage. Ever since, France‘s laws surrounding the wearing of religious symbols in 
public, especially Islamic dress code, have become increasingly strict.
2
 These strict laws 
seem to coincide with the resurfacing of the hijab in cultures abroad, as a growing 
number of Muslim women around the world have elected to wearing the hijab. Many 
academics have termed this new movement ―the new veiling‖. Is it possible that France‘s 
restrictive attempts at controlling the day-to-day particulars of religious life have 
backfired, creating the opposite of their desire effect? What is it about in the dynamics of 
the French state and, on a larger scale, of the global order that generates 
Fundamentalism?  By tracing the events in France starting from the 1989 expulsion of 
female Muslim students, the 2004 law, the aforementioned 2009 European Human Rights 
Court Ruling, and the 2011 ban of the full face veil, I will attempt to prove that that these 
types of laws in the secular framework, have and will continue to generate fundamentalist 
reactions. This is a new type of fundamentalist movement, one which is a product of the 
modern world, and only further proves that the concepts behind fundamentalist theories 
are not a thing of the past. I will attempt to prove this, pointing to the specifics behind 
how the ―new veil‖ movement became an important revolution in the Islamic world, and 
more importantly, how it became a chance for Muslim women to feel free in an 
increasingly restrictive global order. I will proceed in two steps; first, I will outline some 
of the problems with the simplistic understanding of fundamentalism that many western 
                                                        
2
 Ibrahim, Youssef M. “Arab Girls‟ Veils At Issue In France.” The New 
York Times. November 11, 1989. Accessed March 10, 2016. 
http://www.nytimes.com/1989/11/12/world/arab-girls-veils-at-issue-in-
france.html 
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observers have and propose an alternative framework that characterizes the 
fundamentalist phenomenon in a more analytically robust way. Then, I will discuss the 
ways in which the New Veil movement empowers the women who choose to take part in 
it, with reference to the more developed framework given in the first section. 
 The controversy surrounding Muslim women wearing their religious headgear in 
public follows a general trend of distrust and hostility between many western societies 
and Muslim minority populations living within them. In a Pew poll from May of 2017, 
58% of respondents in the United States, Russia, and four Western European countries 
said that the term ―fanatical‖ best described Muslims when asked to associate a number 
of terms with them.
3
 Meanwhile, in a 2006 Pew poll, 30% of respondents in France, 35% 
in Spain, 40% in Germany, and 42% in Great Britain reported being very concerned 
about Islamic extremism in their respective countries.
4
 The New Veil movement has 
become a focus of debate in this area, as its use of traditional Islamic symbols and 
practices have put it at odds with the modern formulation of secularism that predominates 
in much of the developed West. The characterization of this movement as fundamentalist, 
however, demonstrates some of the flaws in the traditional understanding of that concept, 
chiefly the misidentification of the New Veil movement based on the set of symbols that 
it uses. To gain a proper understanding of the role that the movement plays in the social 
ecosystem, it is necessary to disaggregate the various meanings that the veil has in its 
different contexts. That is, although the New Veil movement appeals to traditional ideas 
and utilizes an existing symbolic language, it is intrinsically a modern movement built 
                                                        
3
 http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/05/ 
26/muslims-and-islam-key-findings-in-the-u-s-and-around-the-world/ 
4
 http://www.pewglobal.org/2006/07/06/ 
muslims-in-europe-economic-worries-top-concerns-about-religious-and-
cultural-identity/ 
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around a modern set of interests. 
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CHAPTER II 
INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP RIGHTS IN A MULTICULTURAL 
SOCIETY 
Given the level of attention that Islamic fundamentalism has received, it is worth 
considering what fundamentalism is, both in the general case and in the specific case of 
Islam, as well as what its presence implies for its host society. While even the casual 
observer can point out organizations and movements that are readily identifiable as 
fundamentalist in nature, the distinguishing attributes of fundamentalism are more 
nuanced than discussion of the topic often suggests. That is to say there is a distinction 
between those movements that are traditionalist in nature and those which are reactionary. 
It should be noted here that none of the designations to follow should be associated with 
any specific normative judgment. Both traditionalist and reactionary movement are 
capable of profound personal liberation and brutal violence. The issue of coercion in 
fundamentalist movements will be discussed later, but for now it bears mentioning that 
either type of movement may be coercive. Traditionalist movement have deep roots in 
institutions and practices of the past, and their activities represent a repetition of those 
institutions and practices. They may have changed over time, but generally do so slowly, 
as they are organized around the preservation of a specific historical moment in their 
respective cultures. Although traditionalist groups may interact with the various 
institutions and organizations that make up a modern society, their behavior is based on 
their own historical experience rather than that of an external party. Amish communities 
are a clear example of this type of community, as they largely follow a set of traditions 
based in shared historical experience. Although this group is often placed in contrast to the 
 7 
 
modern western institutions that surround it, its behavior is essentially independent of 
those institutions. That is to say that adherence to a set of traditions that are largely stable 
across time is a core feature of Amish culture, and their contrast with modern western 
society exists only because it has changed more quickly than they have. 
On the other side of the spectrum are reactionary organizations, which may carry 
some of the same outward trappings as traditionalist organizations but operate based on a 
far different set of motivations. That is, a reactionary movement is organized in response 
to some change in society, either in support of but often in opposition to it. A reactionary 
movement may use symbols from a previous point in history. In fact, a reaction 
movement may use the same symbols as traditionalist one, and may even profess a desire 
to reconstitute a particular moment in history, but it does so in response to the modern 
social climate. Indeed, often reactionary movements expressing an affinity for the past 
will yearn for an idealized past environment that never truly existed, often in response to 
a change or perceived change in their respective society. The Christian Right in the 
United States is an example of this sort of movement. Although the Christian Right 
frequently makes reference to existing cultural traditions and expresses a desire to re-
establish those traditions, it is fundamentally rooted in modern political events. That is, 
although many of the subgroups that constitute the Christian Right have existed for 
decades, the movement as a political agent came into being expressly in opposition to 
racial integration and later reproductive rights.
5
 Although reactionary groups like this one 
may vehemently oppose many of the core tenants of the modern order, they could not 
meaningfully exist without it. 
                                                        
5
 http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/05/ 
religious-right-real-origins-107133 
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Taking opposition to the New Veil movement and under Islamic revival 
movements in their most sympathetic formulations, the clash between particularistic 
group identity and liberal notions of multiculturalism stem from a tension between the 
desire to foster egalitarianism and the desire to safeguard group identity. The egalitarian 
pursuit, ensuring the public institutions treat different ethnic groups, religious groups, and 
the like as equal members of society implies a certain flattening of social distinctions, 
while the identity pursuit, respecting the distinctiveness of those groups, requires publicly 
recognized distinctions between groups. 
Charles Taylor lays out an approach to this problem in Multiculturalism, offering 
a counterpoint to the Rousseauian style of cultural politics that emphasizes individual 
self-determination over recognition of group differences. Taylor constructs a view of 
identity centered on the interactions of groups rather than the action of individuals. 
Identity, in Taylor‘s view, is constructed ―dialogically, in response to our relations, 
including our actual dialogues, with others.‖6 The importance of deliberation in forming 
social identities necessitates a set of public institutions designed to incorporate them 
through recognition of different languages, religious traditions, and other distinguishing 
features of social groups. 
Sustainable egalitarianism, Taylor and his co-author‘s argue, must be grounded in 
a policy of recognition. Recognition, they contend, constitutes the desire of each social 
group to see its values reflected in or at the very least respected by public institutions. 
They state that ―The demand for recognition, animated by the ideal of human dignity, 
points in at least two directions, both to the protection of the basic rights of individuals as 
human beings and the acknowledgement of the particular needs of individuals as 
                                                        
6
 Taylor, Charles. Multiculturalism. Princeton University Press, 1994. 7. 
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members of specific cultural groups.‖7 The two elements of Taylor‘s multicultural 
societal framework can come into conflict in several ways. In cases where particular 
group identities have been given a pejorative attribution, as with African Americans in 
the United States, liberal-minded reformers often argue that equality can only be reached 
by removing the dimension of group identities used to implement persecution, or at the 
very least by reducing their salience in society. Such practices usually described as ‗race-
blind‘ or ethnicity-blind more broadly, would sacrifice the second element of Taylor‘s 
multiculturalism in an attempt to achieve the first, while Taylor would argue that social 
institutions should endeavor to combine the two. Furthermore, the particularistic values 
of groups may be in themselves opposed to the liberal interpretation of individual rights 
or even to the recognition of other groups. Public institutions can run into problems 
when, as in the case of nativist groups responding to immigrants in France or hardline 
religious groups responding to the LGBTQ community in the United States, one group 
will not be satisfied with its level of recognition unless the state openly repudiates some 
other group. Contending with these situations forces states to balance the two aspects of 
multiculturalism and to establish standard, often controversially, of which demands by 
social groups are reasonable and which are not. 
The harm that Taylor points to as arising from failure to recognizing different 
cultural groups and acknowledge them as culturally distinct is based in a process of 
alienation. When a particular group is not recognized by public institutions or is 
misrecognized, its role in society is defined by the groups that are recognized, leading to 
a dangerous loss of agency among minority groups. Much as individual identity is 
mediated by interactions within groups, group identity is mediated by interactions 
                                                        
7
 Taylor, Charles. Multiculturalism. 8. 
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between groups within society. He argues that ―our identity is partly shaped by 
recognition or its absence, often by the misrecognition of others, and so a person or group 
of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them 
mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves. 
Nonrecognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, 
imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being.‖8 Group 
recognition is, in Taylor‘s view, not just an expression by the state that group differences 
exist but that individual groups should exercise agency in defining the meaning of those 
differences. Failure to do so, both intrinsically devalues the groups that are not 
recognized by signaling that the state does not value them and imperils their autonomy by 
preventing them from forming their own self-conception. Groups inevitably internalize 
the identity imposed on them by society if such an identity is imposed, Taylor argues, 
even if that identity expressly characterizes the affected group as inferior or undeserving 
relative to other groups.
9
 Internalizing that identity makes individuals of the affected 
group incapable of interacting with their peers as equal citizens, as they see themselves as 
acting under the influence of an inferior nature. 
The root of recognition as a social goal originates, for Taylor, in the modern 
conception of individual dignity as the foundation of the prevailing social order. Earlier 
societies expressed their valuation of individuals in terms of honor rather than dignity. 
While dignity can, and from the modern point of view, should be conferred to all 
individuals equally, honor is necessarily zero sum; it has value only insofar as most of 
                                                        
8
 Taylor, Charles. "The politics of recognition." New contexts of Canadian 
criticism 98 (1997). 25 
9
 Taylor, Charles. "The politics of recognition." 26. 
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society does not possess it.
10
 Modern societies preserve this idea chiefly through notions 
of status; membership in an exclusive country club, admittance to a selective university, 
or accolades for performance at a sporting event, hold value precisely because most 
people do not have them. In contrast to older systems of social organization though, this 
sort of valuation is no longer the fundamental basis for constructing institutions. Rather, 
modern liberal societies see all citizens as intrinsically possessing dignity that entitles 
them to a certain modicum of faire treatment in all dimensions of their lives. With this 
different conception of individual valuation comes a different conception of group 
valuation. A particular identity, under the framework of human dignity, should not be 
characterized as inherently inferior to other identities, as the individuals who adhere to 
that identity are deserving of equal treatment based on their human dignity. 
The need for public institutions to recognize minority groups incorporates an 
element of mutual legitimation insofar as recognition by the state is only meaningful to 
the extent that the state‘s authority is recognized by the groups that it governs. Axel 
Honneth extends Taylor‘s logic of groups recognition by laying out the importance of 
mutuality in establishing a working multicultural society. That is, individuals form and 
maintain their identities with respect to recognition by other actors in society, both the 
state and other social groups, which they themselves recognize as legitimate peers.
11
 
Honneth describes the process of mutual recognition as consisting of three distinct 
aspects: ―self-confidence‖, ―self-respect‖, and ―self-esteem‖, all which arise from the 
broader notion of the ―practical relation to self.‖12 
                                                        
10
 Taylor, Charles. "The politics of recognition." 27. 
11
 Honneth, Axel. The struggle for recognition: The moral grammar of social 
conflicts. Mit Press, 1996. 2. 
12
 Ibid. 
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Self-confidence, for Honneth represents the ability to express and advocate for 
one‘s needs on a legitimate footing. Individuals develop it beginning in early childhood 
as a part of familial relations, and it extends through all interpersonal relationships, 
include those which mold the relative status of various social groups. The role of self-
confidence in the sense that Honneth uses it as a driving force of group conflict in 
cooperation is evident in many minority groups‘ struggles for legal and social 
protections. The expectation that a group cannot express its desires without being labeled 
as conflictual or subversive is a right the majority assumes as given and minority groups 
tend to work strenuously to achieve. 
Self-respect, in Honneth‘s view, constitutes an individual‘s sense that he or she is 
recognized as a legitimate moral act in society, capable of independently participating in 
discourse about what sort of moral good the state should aim to inculcate in its citizens. 
This capacity is dependent upon the legal status that the state confers on individuals 
insofar as the legal rights conferred by the state form the basis by which a person can 
claim to be an autonomous participant in social debates and demand that all other 
members of society take his or her views seriously.
13
 This idea might broadly be placed 
within the modern conception of citizenship as a foundation for equality. To be a citizen 
is not simply to possess a set of civil rights: the right not to be tortured, prevented from 
freely assembling, imprisoned without due process, etc., but also to be allowed free 
access to public debates regarding the general trajectory of society. This right rests on a 
tacit agreement that every person imbued with the status of citizens can be considered a 
rational agent capable of arriving at moral determinations through reason, and cannot be 
dismissed through claims that he or she is acting on bass motivations and is 
                                                        
13
 Honneth, Axel. 4. 
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fundamentally incapable of joining public discourse in good faith. This expectation has 
become an especially volatile flashpoint in Western societies where issues of identity are 
the subject of social conflict. Whether the groups in question are political minorities such 
as women attempting to assert independence in traditionally male-dominated spaces, or 
demographic minorities such as African-Americans in the United States attempting to 
dismantle racially repressive institutions, the issue of self-respect as Honneth describes it 
plays an important role in the discussion. That is, the majority is seen by default as 
engaging in a rational discussion with competing arguments derived from logic and 
evidence, while minorities frequently claim to have engaged in a similar process 
motivated by different sets of experiences but are often dismissed as acting irrationally on 
issues that involve their identities. 
Self-esteem, in Honneth‘s view, takes on a similar function to that of self-respect, 
but with a particular focus on the assertion of individuality by members of minority 
groups. That is, individuals in society have an inherent need to feel that they are unique 
and that they hold some indispensable value.
14
 This idea is manifested in the minority 
groups‘ desire not to be constrained by stereotypes, or consistently be identified solely as 
a member of a minority population without distinguished individual characteristics. For 
the majority, this type of recognition is assumed; group identification is subordinated to 
personal qualities in assessing what an individual‘s role in society should be. Among 
minority populations, however, this process is often reversed; group identification is 
portrayed as determining, or at the very least overpowering personal qualities, and an 
individual‘s role in society is decided on the basis of group identity. In this sense, 
minority groups wish to be recognized as heterogeneous, with members who differ on a 
                                                        
14
 Honneth, Axel. 5. 
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range of personal preferences and have the right to express those differences openly. 
Addressing a similar issue, specifically focusing on minority representation in 
multiethnic societies, Will Kymlicka proposes a related framework for public 
institutions‘ stance toward group recognition, although his view departs from Taylor‘s in 
its of weighting of individual and group interests. Kymlicka draws a distinction between 
different types of diverse societies and different dimensions by which public institutions 
might recognize or fail to recognize the rights of minority groups. He identifies two 
primary types of such societies: ―multination states‖ and ―polyethnic states.‖15 The 
former he argues, are states that formed through the amalgamation of several smaller 
states, each representing a distinct ethnic group, into a single entity, while the latter are 
states where minority ethnic groups have entered society over time through the migration 
of individuals and families.
16
 It should go without saying that almost any modern state 
would display some features of both models, but Kymlicka‘s language is nevertheless 
useful for describing broad differences between societies. Where it appears in Western 
cultures, the New Veil movement is largely a phenomenon of polyethnic societies, and as 
such commonly triggers a defensive reaction from its critics, who claim that the 
movement represents an incursion against established values rather than claiming that it 
has arisen from long-standing divisions in society. 
Perhaps more importantly, Kymlicka distinguishes between several different 
types of minority interests in diverse societies, and arrives at different conclusions about 
the place that those interests should play in his conception of liberal multiculturalism. He 
divides minority rights broadly among ―self-government rights,‖ ―polyethnic rights,‖ and 
                                                        
15
 Kymlicka, Will. Multicultural citizenship: A liberal theory of minority rights. 
Clarendon Press, 1995. 6. 
16
 Ibid. 
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―special representation rights.‖17 Self-government rights constitute the guarantee that 
minority groups be allowed to control their own territories and subcultures, acting as 
administrative units or enfranchised political constituencies commensurate in power with 
their relative size. Polyethnic rights consist of protections for minority groups‘ 
distinguishing norms and practices. Where the state respects such rights, minority groups 
enjoy state recognition of and support for their holidays, and traditional activities or 
talismans are treated with legal forbearance if not with deference. Special representation 
rights constitute guaranteed access to the levers of power in society through explicit 
methods such as apportionment of seats in the legislature or rotating guaranteed terms for 
the executive elected from their group.
18
 
The issues of recognition that predominate in debates over the New Veil 
movement and other movements of a similar persuasion tend to hinge on polyethnic 
rights, on the degree to which society as a whole respects the ability of individual 
Muslims to carry out practices specific to their culture, and where necessary builds legal 
frameworks to safeguard that ability. Another distinction drawn by Kymlicka, and one 
that creates a substantial point of departure from the multicultural theory of Taylor, 
separates the rights of minority groups into two categories: ―internal restrictions‖ and 
―external protections.‖19 Internal restrictions comprise the controls that a group may 
impose on its members, such as taboos on when and to whom members of the group can 
marry, or dietary rules. External protections, on the other hand, consist of safeguards 
against coercive power from other groups in society, such as the sort of guaranteed 
                                                        
17
 Kymlicka, Will. 6-7. 
18
 Ibid. 
19
 Kymlicka, Will. 7. 
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representation in government mentioned previously.
20
 Kymlicka argues that a measure of 
external protection can be a stabilizing force in the practice of liberal politics, but that 
internal restrictions may clash with the sort of institutional machinery necessary to foster 
a liberal multicultural society. Such a society, he claims, must be founded upon principles 
of individual autonomy, to which potentially illiberal strictures enforces by minority 
groups may be deleterious.
21
 Like Taylor, Kymlicka argues that attempting to build 
institutions that ignore group identities on the basis that each individual should be treated 
equally will fail to fulfill the basic need of recognition. Kymlicka, however, tempers this 
assertion by drawing a distinction between which broad categories of group practices 
should and should not be recognized. For Kymlicka, policies aimed at fostering 
multiculturalism will only work if the precepts of liberalism are enforced on the group 
level, and in particular groups should not be allowed to pick and choose which of the 
individual rights espoused by liberalism their members may enjoy. 
This group-centric view of societal organization, and the related critique of pure 
liberalism, bears heavily on the grounding of the New Veil movement. In this case, the 
recognition interest of Muslims who adhere to the movement is represented in 
government policy and shares social norms surrounding the veil. A ban on the veil, or 
even a strong, socially pervasive conception that wearing the veil is indicative of an 
undesirable cultural stance, is an element of a refusal to recognize a certain strain of 
Islamic culture within society. Often, the framing for this refusal to recognize is built 
upon the idea that Islamic ideology surrounding the veil is fundamentally illiberal, and as 
such cannot be included in a liberal social order. In the purely liberal interpretation, that 
                                                        
20
 Ibid. 
21
 Ibid. 
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ideology is indefensible on the grounds that it threatens individual autonomy, and that 
threat trumps considerations of the group‘s choices as a collective entity. 
The need for recognition that Taylor identifies overlaps with a distinction between 
a type of uniform moral standard that liberal thought tends to advocate and a type of 
pluralistic moral standard that allows for multiple institutional approaches to respect for 
human dignity. Chantal Mouffe addresses this distinction in discussing the subject of 
human rights in Western and non-Western societies, arguing that the particular 
formulation of human rights that predominates in many Western intellectual circles is not 
necessarily transferable to a non-Western context.
22
 Mouffe argues that ―there is 
something very problematic about the idea of human rights as it is usually envisaged, i.e., 
as a cultural invariant that should be accepted by all cultures. As has often been pointed 
out, this is because human rights are presented as being both universally valid and 
uniquely European in origin.‖23 The model of human rights that liberal advocates of 
globalization advocate, Mouffe, contends, is not only a conceptual framework about 
human dignity but also an actualization of that framework in a set of cultural and political 
institutions. Although human rights are described in a western context using universalist 
language, they really represent a specific formulation of government and culture that 
predominates in the west, meaning that spreading this conception of human rights outside 
of the west requires that existing cultural and civic institutions be remade. 
The adoption of human rights in their western liberal conception, for Mouffe, is 
specifically tied to the institution of liberal democracy and the process of rational debate 
as a mechanism of social progress. Mouffe argues that genuine respect for universal 
                                                        
22
 Mouffe, Chantal. "Which world order: cosmopolitan or multipolar?." Ethical 
Perspectives 15, no. 4 (2008). 453-454. 
23
 Mouffe, Chantal. 454. 
 18 
 
human dignity requires a decoupling of the goal of good governance with the frameworks 
that have been adopted to achieve it in the West, writing ―liberal democratic institutions 
and the Western language of human rights represents only one possible political 
language game among others, and it cannot claim to have a privileged relation to 
rationality. We should therefore accept the possibility of a plurality of legitimate answers 
to the question of the good regime.‖24 This approach to human rights places the issue in a 
more abstract frame, requiring that reformers mold institutions, particularly political 
institutions, to meet the cultural properties of the polity rather than replicating institutions 
that have been validated elsewhere. 
The primacy of the individual, and the formulation of individual identity in 
Western liberal thought presents a major point of interest for Mouffe‘s argument. 
Western society, Mouffe claims, prioritizes individual independence from coercive 
influences in forming institutions, but this viewpoint is not universal. Rather, some other 
societies operate based on the notion of ―overlapping selves. Those bound together by 
familial, kinship, religious or other ties do not see themselves as independent and self-
containing ontological units involved in specific kinds of relationships with others, but 
rather as bearers of overlapping selves whose identities are constituted by and incapable 
of being defined in isolation from these relationships.‖25 This claim bears on discussion 
of the New Veil movement in two distinct ways; first, it indicates the specific clash of 
ideologies that underlies debates over the veil when those debates are expressed in terms 
of secularism rather than ethnicity. From the liberal secular point of view, the veil is often 
seen as a symbol of individual subordination to cultural elites, and as such at odds with 
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the notion of individual dignity to which most Western societies claim to aspire. This 
conception is often mistaken insofar as it excludes the sense of cultural suppression that 
brands the veil a symbol of resistance to authority in the Western context, but it is 
nonetheless important in understanding the social forces driving the debate. Second, the 
veil as a symbol of group identity reinforces the role of recognition as a demand against 
public institutions. The type of collectively-derived identity that Mouffe discusses places 
additional emphasis on the need of cultural groups, not simply individuals, to be 
recognized as legitimize actors in society. To the extent that individuals conceive 
themselves as the product of communal relations, they will see respect for the group as 
inseparable from respect for them individually. 
Bhikhu Parekh makes a similar argument to Mouffe on the subject of 
multicultural societies, arguing for an ―equality of difference‖ that respects individual 
human dignity but recognizes minority group practices as legitimate. In Essences, Parekh 
critiques that notion that meaningful equality among groups can be achieved through a 
policy that aims to smooth over differences between those groups and apply uniform 
standards to all members of society. To illustrate this point, Parekh points to a 
phenomenon of Asian job candidates in Britain being placed at a systematic disadvantage 
because they did not make eye contact with interviewers, making the culturally-motivated 
assumption that showing respect to an authority figure by refraining form eye contact was 
appropriate.
26
 Attempting to apply the same standard of behavior across all groups, 
Parekh argues, does not really establish equality but rather constitutes an imposition of 
values on the minority by the majority. Liberal-minded reformers may see themselves as 
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establishing a system by which all groups are treated equally, but the groups embedded in 
that system are more likely to see public institutions demanding that they abandon the 
cultural moorings through which they have constructed their identities. 
Resistance to this type of cultural imposition is central to the discontent that 
motivates many adherents of the New Veil movement. Advocates of secular social policy 
who see bans or at the very least taboos on the veil as a necessary part of liberal institutes 
claim, when expressing their argument sincerely, that prohibiting the veil is a necessary 
measure to create an equal society. No group, either the minority or the majority, may 
implement cultural practices that subjugate women, and the veil is, from their 
perspective, only the particular manifestation of that subjugation that appears in Muslim 
communities. Parekh would dismiss this idea, instead arguing that each group must be 
allowed to establish its own sets of norms, and the behavior of the state toward minority 
groups must reflect their cultural backgrounds rather than attempting to ignore those 
backgrounds as a means to achieve uniform treatment. 
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CHAPTER III 
  THE EVOLUTION OF LAICITE IN FRANCE  
 
 In order to begin to understand France‘s policies and laws protecting secularism, it 
is necessary to analyze its history with religious freedom and independence, a history 
dating back to the pre-revolutionary era. In the 18
th
 century, much of the French 
population was Catholic, and the French state was deeply enmeshed with the Catholic 
Church. In fact, public frustration with corruption in the Church and a desire for freedom 
of religion play a major role in generating support for the revolution.
27
  Philosophically, 
this concept is found in a certain brand of political philosophy that originated with Jean-
Jacques Rousseau, a philosophy that emphasizes the greater general interests and shared 
values over individual interests.
28 
After the French Revolution, the newly-instated 
government exerted tremendous pressure to renounce Catholicism, quickly escalating to 
the extreme levels that facilitated the Reign of Terror (1793-1794). Those who sided with 
the Catholic Church were viewed as enemies of the Republic and often executed, causing 
many Catholic to begin practicing their religion in secret. The French historical 
experience with religion has contributed in a very direct way to the harsh view that many 
in the country have taken with respect to Muslims and other religious minorities 
displaying religious symbols in public. As in many European nations, these groups are 
seen by many as a threatening other who fail to assimilate at best and attempt to 
undermine the fabric of their host society at worst. The secular culture that has 
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characterized France since the revolution, with its emphasis on keeping schools and 
religious institutions separate, has compounded this already fraught relationship. The 
French document ―Declaration of the Rights of Man‖ - a document much like the United 
States‘ Declaration of Independence - states freedom of religion as a fundamental human 
right, albeit with the additional remark that it must remain within the rules of the law. 
This statement clarifies where the French state stands on the delicate balance between 
individual rights and secular government. That is, although the government aims to 
protect individuals‘ right to freedom of expression, it will also take an active role in 
curtailing the influence of an organization like the Catholic Church when it comes to 
matters of law. I will return to this subject when discussing the role of coercion and when 
discussing the growth of fundamentalism, but for now it is sufficient to note that when 
confronted with a choice between absolute protection of individual agency and 
prevention of religious influence on the state, the Declaration of the Rights of Man places 
a higher priority on the latter. 
The Law of 1905 continued along this trajectory, formally separating Church and 
State.
29
 Under the law, the French government was no longer allowed to fund any 
religious groups and all religious buildings became the property of state and local 
governments. This law also banned any religious sign or emblem on public buildings or 
monuments. It is with this law that secularism evolves from a purely theoretical and 
philosophical idea into a fixture of daily life. More important, it represents the first 
instance of the law expressly prohibiting religious symbols and dress code in public 
spaces. In many ways, it laid the groundwork for laws that would be passed some one 
                                                        
29
 Taylor, Tristan. "The Influence of the Catholicism Before During and 
After the French Revolution." 
 23 
 
hundred years later prohibiting the veil in all public schools. The law also states that the 
―Republic ensures freedom of conscience. It guarantees freedom of worship limited only 
by the following rules in the interest of public order.” The law ostensibly maintained 
individuals‘ freedom to practice the religion of their choosing, but because of the broad 
interpretation of what constitutes a disturbance of the public order in France, in many 
cases the law opened the door for restrictions on religious practice. The law of 1905 
manifested the French principle of laïcité, the meaning and understanding of which 
constantly evolved throughout 20
th
 century French politics.
30 
 
 In Politics of the Veil, Joan Wallach Scott describes laïcté as a uniquely French 
branch of secularism and the ―cornerstone of French republicanism.‖ According to Scott, 
what makes laïtcé so uniquely French is the ―role of the state in protecting individuals 
from the claims of the religion.‖31 In other words, one must obey state laws regardless of 
religious affiliation. In her article, ―Freedom of Religion and the Transformation of 
Public Order in France‖, Rim-Sarah Alouane looks at the state‘s role with a critical lens. 
She argues that there is ―no clear definition of laïcité”, and that France uses this principle 
as a means of justifying any restriction of wearing religious symbols, as well as freedom 
of speech. She also traces the evolution of the concept of laïcité and how it eventually 
became part of the definition of French Nationalism, a ―protection of a shared identity‖. 
32
 This shared identity requires religion to be kept separate from society, so that it cannot 
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become a divisive force to the French identity. It is in its ambiguity that the concept of 
laïcité assumes its potential power as a political tool. Scott describes the history of laïcité 
in French schools, illuminating President Chirac‘s hypocritical rejection of Stasi‘s 
commission to add Jewish and Muslim holidays to the public school calendar. The fact 
that ―Christian holidays don‘t violate the principle of secularism [is] proof to critics of 
‗laïcité‘ that it is not universal at all but is, rather, intimately bound up with the dominant 
Catholic religious culture of the nation‖. 33 Instead of laicite opposing religion, it instead 
is proven to be practically generated from religion. Considering that France‘s attitude 
towards shared identity was founded in the 17th century hardships of practicing 
Catholicism, laicite is clearly intrinsically tied to religious circumstances. Scott‘s analysis 
not only supports Alouane‘s claim and critique of laïcité, but also provides greater insight 
regarding France‘s first noted conflict with the veil in 1989. 
 In 1989, a principal at a French public school told three Muslim female students 
that they could not come to school with a head cover. The press quickly picked up this 
story, sparking public outrage and debate. A New York Times article describes the 
incident as follows: ―the debate has resulted in public spectacles like the appearance of 
two deputies at the National Assembly in women‘s scarves and demonstrations in the 
streets of Paris,‖ (Ibrahim, The New York Times). 34 The Education Minister Lionel 
Jospin responded by saying, ― fundamentalist girls should be ‗persuaded‘ to take off their 
veils in class,‖ but not forced to because that would be considered discrimination. 
Although this statement is certainly less strict than the 2009 court ruling, it still harbors 
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the seeds of discrimination supported by laicite. Jospin‘s choice of words categorizes the 
hijab-wearing women into a singular group and identity, creating a sense of otherness. 
What he is really saying is that Muslim women need to be persuaded to give up their 
visible Muslim identity (as in the veil) in order to be accepted as French. Only with this 
surrender of certain aspects of their private life could they become one with the public 
identity. Although he argues against outward discrimination, he calls for Muslim women 
to reject their identity.  These policies were created or designed in order to integrate 
Muslims into French society and the French way of acting and thinking.  
 The reaction to the 1989 veil issue created a schism among France‘s political left. 
One group took a softer approach, thinking along the lines of, ―the veil…no problem 
because a small fundamentalist minority cannot threaten a secular society of 55 million 
people,‖ (Ibrahim, The New York Times). The other group of French leftists considered 
the veil a serious problem because they believed it was an attack on the principals of 
women‘s emancipation and feminism. This view tends to strip Muslim women of their 
agency, assuming the veil is something that was forced upon them and not something that 
they would choose to wear to express themselves and their identity. This view, although 
claiming to empower women, only succeeds in enforcing the stereotype that Muslim 
women are passive, a stereotype which has no foundation in fact. The first view is 
inherently xenophobic as it assumes those part of any fundamentalist group automatically 
constitute a threat. The only reason why they are not worried about the veil is because the 
Muslim population is too small to affect change in society. Again this harps back to 
laicite; do what you want as long as you do not disrupt the public, or the society.  There 
is not a major group that seems to be actually defending the rights of Muslim women as 
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individuals. To truly demonstrate just how far this goes, even the founding member of 
France‘s anti-racism organization considers the veil, ―a sign of imprisonment that 
considers women to be subhumans under the law of Islam,‖ (Ibrahim, The New York 
Times). Considering the French sentiment around the veil in 1989, it does not come as a 
surprise that the laws following this event only became more and more strict and 
repressive to Muslim women and their chosen dress. However, these anti-Muslim 
sentiments are not solely rooted in French secularism, but are also a reaction to the 
postcolonial aftermath of the fall of the French empire in the 20th century. 
The New Veil Movement has arisen semi-independently in a number of countries 
around the world, but it shares certain core characteristics in each of its incarnations. The 
movement follows a period in the Muslim world wherein the veil had decreased in 
prevalence, especially among urban, educated populations and often in conjunction with 
broader societal programs aimed at modernization.
35
 This fact is important in 
understanding the ideological valence of the New Veil movement in that it shows the 
discontinuity between the old cultural practice of wearing the veil and the new one. 
Muslim women who wore the veil in the 1970s and those who wore it in the 1930s might 
use the same symbolic garb, but they do so under markedly different circumstances. 
Focusing on the re-veiling movement as it has appeared in Egypt, Katherine 
Bullock identifies several different motivations for women who have joined the New Veil 
movement: an expression of politics, an expression of faith, a bid for ―continued access to 
the public sphere,‖ and a ―statement of personal identity.‖36 In Egypt, the political 
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motivation of the New Veil movement was centered specifically around the country‘s 
colonial legacy, with its mandate that cultures in occupied territories be subsumed into 
the culture of the occupiers.
37
 The nature of colonialism necessitates that native 
populations be made into political minorities, if not demographic ones, in their own 
countries, and the legacy of that form of cultural domination shifts the terrain of social 
contests over legitimacy. This effort explains the break between the groups advocating 
the veil in previous periods and those executing a revival. In the past, the veil represented 
the influence of a political majority in Egypt, but occupation by Western powers shifted 
it, at least in the minds of some Egyptians, to a symbol of a political minority. In this 
manner, the movement to adopt the veil anew represents a demand for cultural 
recognition. 
The religious motivation that animates the New Veil movement demonstrates a 
somewhat different character that the political motivation does, although the notion of 
resistance to dominant social strictures is common to both. Bullock describes Muslim 
women who stated that they wore the veil for religious reasons, rather than as a statement 
of political autonomy, as tending to cite an immutable standard of Islamic morality, and 
tending to view other Muslims who do not wear Islamic dress as out of sync with that 
standard.
38
 The universalist way that respondents speak in the studies to which Bullock 
makes references seems on the surface to indicate a continuity between the conservative 
Muslims of the past who advocated the veil and those among modern revival movements. 
The environments of these different groups, however, show a marked discontinuity that 
may not be visible when viewing the movements in isolation. Indonesia, for example, had 
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not previously adopted the veil as a tradition, but a number of women there have 
nevertheless taken to wearing the veil there as a symbol of piety.
39
 This practice 
contradicts the existing social mores of their society, and is often portrayed as ―not being 
part of ancestral traditions, which are very important in Indonesia,‖ but rather as a 
―foreign, Arab import, out of sync with local customs.‖40 The expressions of continuity 
based on Islamic principles of morality in this case do not match the reality of stark 
cultural discontinuity associated with the adoption of foreign modes of dress. A number 
of different causes might be identified for the growth of the New Veil movement in 
Indonesia, such as a growing prominence of Islamic identity over ethnic identity, but 
which of those causes actually dominates in society is irrelevant. Regardless of the 
movement‘s sources, it represents a demand for recognition among Muslims in a society 
where they feel that their group identities are not adequately represented by public 
institutions. 
Furthermore, the religious motivation underlying the New Veil movement acts 
along a unique social gradient. Although the movement has spread across multiple social 
strata, younger and relatively poorer women were more likely to re-veil than their older 
and richer counterparts, often stating as a justification that the veil acts as a leveling 
mechanism, mitigating some of the visible representations of social inequality by 
establishing a uniform mode of dress among women from different backgrounds.
41
 The 
veil thus constitutes a symbol of resistance to an economic system as well as a political 
one. 
The motivation from access to the public sphere that Bullock identifies acted in a 
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multifaceted way among Egyptian women, with different responds pointing to different 
specific functions that the veil played in granting them greater autonomy. In some cases, 
the veil served as an equalizing measure in the same way that it did for women claiming a 
religious motivation, while in others it acted as a marker of traditional Islamic norms 
wherein the husband in a marriage acts as the primary breadwinner, to which some 
women gravitated when Egypt‘s economic downturn put enormous economic pressure on 
working women. In still others, the practice of wearing the veil functioned as a 
countervailing force for women who wanted to reap the benefits of secular liberalism, 
such as the ability to work without stigma, but also wanted to assuage doubts among 
traditional relatives.
42
  
Arlene Elowe Macleod makes a similar point in a study of women in Cairo who 
have adopted the veil independently, placing a heavy emphasis on the veil as a symbol of 
self-advocacy among women living in a changing society. Faced with growing economic 
and social stresses associated with Egypt‘s push to employ women in the civil service, 
many of the women Macleod discusses saw wearing the veil as a means to express 
discontent with a system that they felt put undue pressure on them. The use of a symbol 
carrying heavy traditional associations acts as a method to slot women‘s advocacy into a 
social framework that ordinarily places them in a subordinate role.
43
 Here, the 
discontinuity between women who re-veil and their past counterparts is especially stark. 
Women among the New Veil movement face new societal and economic pressure, and 
enjoy new opportunities, imbuing the veil with a different sort of social significance. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE NEW VEIL MOVEMENT, 
A TRANSNATIONAL PERSPERCTIVE 
 
The veil as an expression of personal identity hews quite directly toward the sort 
of group recognition that Taylor and like-minded thinkers identify. When addressing this 
motivation, Bullock shifts her focus more towards Muslim immigrants and their 
descendants living in the West, where the veil interacts heavily with the desire for 
recognition by public institutions. Women in many of these cases choose to wear the veil 
against the wishes of spouses and families, the type of relations that would normally have 
advocated the veil in its older cultural context.
44
 When describing their reasons for 
wearing the veil, respondents appealed directly to the sort of identity-based interest that 
one might express from the group-centric view of multiculturalism. One second-
generation British Asian woman said that ―My cultural background and my family‘s roots 
are in another part of the world. These things are very important to me and make me feel 
special. It is important to me not to lose these parts of my life.‖45 The need to display 
publicly a symbol of Muslim identity is in this case expressly derived from a sense that 
such identity is both personal important and in danger of decay, as public institutions, 
whether formal or informal, fail to recognize it. 
 The issue at hand stems from two major problems in constructing a liberal secular 
society, the first a clash between liberalism and secularism and the second an apparent 
contradiction within the bounds of liberalism alone. The first issue arises in attempting to 
reconcile the desire to maintain the separation of Church and state with the desire to 
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safeguard freedom of expression. At least on the surface, these goals appear to be entirely 
complementary. After all, in France and many other parts of the world the move towards 
a strong separation of Church and state began with the recognition of a hegemonic 
Church wielding unchecked power in nearly every corner of society, often with 
government officials complicit in or actively contributing to the system run by a political 
Church. Establishing a liberal democracy would require that no segment of the 
government be allowed to make its own rules and that no agency of the state would 
endeavor to mete out rewards and punishments based on the beliefs of citizens. The 
solution to the problem seems clear: the state should never enact a law stating that some 
religious activity is forbidden or some other religious activity is compulsory, nor should 
the powers of government every be granted to a religious organization. Simply put, a 
secular government would not afford special status of any sort to religious groups but 
would instead treat them the same way that it treats all other groups in society. Before 
long, though, this sort of policy runs into trouble some corner cases. How, for example, 
should the state treat individuals who break secular laws for religious reasons, as in the 
1990 Employment Division vs. Smith case in the United States, or treat organizations that 
cite religious objections to government mandates, such as in the 2014 Burwell vs. Hobby 
Lobby Stores Inc. case? At a certain point, it becomes impossible for the state to keep its 
hands entirely clean in dealing with religion; either it must leave in place a law that has a 
direct impact on the practice of religion or it must carve out special circumstances for 
religious groups based on their beliefs. From the liberal viewpoint, individuals should not 
be restricted in the types of choices they make or the reasons that they make them 
assuming that they do little or no harm to their peers. From the secular standpoint, 
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though, the promotion of particular religious practices, or religion in general, cannot be 
promoted by the state in any form. The government may be bound by laws and 
regulations that skirt the issue of religion, but the state itself is still composed of people 
who may have preferences from one religious practice or another, and if they are allowed 
to integrate that preference into the apparatus of the government, the secular directives 
that underpin the institution are meaningless. Differences in the specifics of a given 
religious practices only compound the problem, as they can narrow the effect of a law to 
a specific religious group even if it makes no explicit reference to that group. For 
example, if we were to indulge the 2004 law‘s proponents and make the extremely 
generous assumption that the singling out of Muslim girls occurred because the hijab is a 
much more visible talisman than a cross or similar object that can be concealed 
underneath a person‘s clothes, the outcome of the law would be unchanged and our 
conundrum would persist. 
 In different contexts, liberal secular governments have applied different solutions. 
In the United States, courts of skirted around the issue wherever they can and made 
compromises when the issue was unavoidable, arguing that where the burden on the 
public is relatively small, special allowances for religious groups are acceptable. The 
French government and others like it have largely taken the opposite approach, and no 
clear consensus has emerged about which is generally preferable within the ideological 
framework of secular liberalism. It should be noted that this manner of ambiguity opens 
the door in many ways for minority groups to be targeted. Insofar as such groups are 
perceived as an others with foreign practices and ethics, casting their behavior as harmful 
to the secular order rather than foundational to the liberal one can be easier for advocates 
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of religious restrictions than it would be for more widely recognized groups whose 
activity is more broadly normalized. That is, because liberal secularist might be divided 
on which sort of policy satisfies their norms, the injection of national or ethnic animus 
could easily tip the scales. If the issue lent itself to clearly delineated positions either in 
support of or in opposition to liberal ideas, a policy with heavy shades of islamophobia 
might at the very least trigger some cognitive dissonance among the majority population. 
With that potentially cross-cutting issue removed, however, ethnic ties take center stage. 
 With the issue framed in this way, it becomes clear that the New Veil movement is 
not necessarily a wholehearted rejection of liberal secularism as an ideology but rather an 
assertion of a particular position on an internal contradiction intrinsic to liberal 
secularism. That is, in wearing the veil as a mark of individual agency, adherents of the 
New Veil movement emphasize the liberal over the secular. 
 The role of individual agency in the issue of the veil ties into the second problem 
engendered by liberal secularism, that of coercion. This contradiction does not require the 
secular aspect of the philosophical framework to which the French state adheres, but the 
secular aspect intensifies the issue given the potential for coercion built into most 
religious groups. Ostensibly, a liberal government should seek to minimize coercion 
within its territory to the greatest extent possible. The constraints of a stable constitution 
work to achieve this goal on the public level, preventing the government from executing 
power overreach by suppressing dissent or limiting mechanisms of accountability. It 
quickly becomes clear, however, that preventing coercion by the state is not enough. 
Private companies, community organizations, and civic associations can be coercive as 
well when left unchecked, although they often use different methods than the state does, 
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frequently preferring to control their members through social ties and economic 
dependency than through force. Even so, in certain areas the measures that the state can 
use to curtail coercion by private entities are usually uncontroversial. At least in liberal 
democracies, laws mandating that a person cannot be killed for refusing a marriage or 
thrown in a debtor‘s prison do not tend to trigger mainstream opposition in the modern 
world. Problems begin to arise when the state must regulate otherwise unrestricted 
behavior in order to safeguarding the rights of individuals, in fact to regulate the behavior 
of those same individuals whose rights are ostensibly being protected. Ordinarily, 
accepting the liberal perspective would imply that as long as an individual makes 
informed consent to participate in a practice of any sort, it is not the place of the state to 
intervene, provided that the individual is not doing significant harm to him or herself or 
others. The presence of a sufficiently cohesive and socially pervasive community, 
however, complicates this principle. That is, even if the threat of violence is absent, and 
individual who chooses to wear a veil, enter a marriage, or remained in a cloistered 
community might do so in response to a threat of social ostracization or simply because 
he or she has been raised from a young age to accept certain strictures as given. Under 
those circumstances, the argument goes, the individual‘s choice is not meaningfully free  
even when it appears so. Under the assumption that the choice is thus restricted, the state 
can only counteract the coercive influence of the community by forbidding the practice 
that would otherwise be required. 
 The problem with a policy along these lines is intuitive. It would require that at 
some point the state make determinations about when decisions are truly free and when 
they are merely an endpoint in a chain of coercive systems that have exerted a persistent 
 35 
 
effect on the agent‘s psyche. Furthermore, it would require that the state make a 
determination about when socialization by a given community does and does not qualify 
as coercive. For example, a Muslim community in France might contend that it teaches 
young girls to respect their bodies by wearing the veil while agents of the state argue that 
it coerces them by inculcating notions of shame and submission in them from a young 
age. In many scenarios, liberal governments have decided to err on the side of 
nonintervention when it comes to this manner of issue, albeit with the exception of 
certain heavily restrictive practices; most liberal democracies would not allow a person to 
sell him or herself into slavery, for example. In the case of the ban on religious symbols 
in France, however, the government has decided that Muslim women do not have the 
freedom to choose their attire due to the traditions of their community and must have the 
choice made for them. 
 It is important to mention here the close relationship between the veil as a symbol 
and the identities of the women who wear it. Afsaneh Najmabadi points out that the veil 
as a physical object cannot be considered separately from the veil as a symbol that 
permeates all modes of expression for the women who ascribe to it. She writes ―The 
production of a new verbal language went along with production of a new bodily 
language…before the physical veil was discarded, it was replaced by an invisible 
metaphoric veil.‖46 That is to say that the veil is representative of a deeper set of cultural 
norms that are not really subject to government policies. Even insofar as a government 
can prevent Muslim from physically wearing the veil, the symbol that it represents cannot 
be fully purged from their cultural identity or social discourse. 
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 As before, it is important to note here that the issue of otherness plays an important 
role in shaping the discourse about coercion in the case of Muslim women and the veil. In 
addition to the complex issue of power and submission tied up in discussion of the New 
Veil movement, in the West, the veil is a stronger symbol of ethnic and religious 
difference to many than of specifically gendered power dynamics. Wendy Brown 
addresses this idea in discussing the changing role of tolerance in liberal Western 
societies. The term tolerance, she argues, has been adopted as the antithesis of violence 
and bigotry in the liberal democratic context, but has in practice retained many of its 
troubling aspects. Specifically, it necessitates an asymmetry of power whereby the 
dominant group magnanimously allows subordinate groups to exist, with the implicit 
understanding that which behaviors are permitted depend solely on the will of the 
dominant group.
47
 In this context, prohibition of the veil takes on an additional societal 
implication, namely an assertion of agency by a subgroup in opposition to the opinion 
expressed by the majority. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE REACTION TO ISLAM IN FRANCE 
 
 The discourse on secularism and the evolution of legislation from Catholic versus 
Secular to Muslim versus Secular can largely be pinpointed to the immigration of North 
Africans to France during the 1960‘s and 1970‘s. This immigration was part of the 
aftermath of the collapse of the French Empire. Prior to this point, France colonized 
Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco, and occupied Lebanon. When these countries destabilized 
as they sought independence from France, people started to flee to France for protection 
and although they were born in the colonies, they considered themselves fully French. 
For these immigrants, preserving the French identity was not only how they grew up, but 
also essential to fitting into France and not being seen as outsiders.
48
 The veiled Muslim 
immigrants in the 1960‘s and 1970‘s did not cause outcries from the French society. 
According to Mahmood Mamdani, this occurred due to the ―culturalization of political 
conflict: ‗It is no longer the market (capitalism) nor the state (democracy), but culture 
(modernity) that is said to be the dividing line between those in favor of a peaceful, civic 
existence and those inclined to terror.‖ 49  In post political societies, where social political 
life or state rule is more involved in rational administration and not debate about the 
economy, all conflicts are politically neutralized. They are no longer perceived as 
politico-economic conflicts, but restated as cultural conflicts.  Thus, the French point of 
view changed and according to Joan Wallach Scott, ―the language of conquest is 
                                                        
48
 Dr Nigel Ashton, review of Western Imperialism in the Middle East, 1914–
1958, (review no. 575) http://www.history.ac.uk/reviews/review/575 Date 
accessed: 10 March, 2016 
49
 Mahmood, Mamdani, Good Muslim/Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, 
and the Roots of Terror (New York: Pantheon, 2004), 18. 
 38 
 
reversed…Muslims became an enemy within, neither entirely foreign nor yet fully 
members of the nation- an unassimilated, unassimilable presence.‖50 In other words, there 
is this pressing need in the late 20th century French society for Muslim immigrants to be 
―integrated‖ and ―tolerated‖. But what does tolerance mean in the French context? It is 
the late subjective fear of the proximity of the other. In the case of France, the word 
―tolerance‖ conceals a very intolerant intention, working as a name for its opposite. The 
very fact that it is used so often means that clearly the French society has difficulty 
tolerating the proximity of the immigrants. 
The growth of the New Veil movement has proven of particular interest in France, 
where the strong secular traditions of the state frequently clash with the religious 
underpinnings of the movement. The doctrine of Laicite governs the core of secular 
policy in France, creating a strong separation between church and state, considerably 
stronger than the separation in the United States. While the process of secularization 
began after the French Revolution, the term Laicite and the policy embodied in it truly 
came into their own beginning in 1880, when the French state implemented a number of 
policies aimed at giving to the state a number of powers to regulate religious 
organizations. Two such policies arrived in the form of restrictions on the Society of 
Jesus and a requirement that all congregations apply for ―legal recognition.‖51 The latter 
of these policy resulted in raids on several religious institutions and the expulsion of 
several thousand clerical figures. Other similar policies followed, sanctioning citizens 
who had a religious education and banning certain religious practices at public event such 
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as funerals.
52
 A 1901 law extended the requirement for religious organizations to register 
for the state, requiring all congregations to apply for authorization from parliament, 
opening up those that did not apply or were not approved to seizure of property.
53
 While 
this law was later replaced, the history of Laicite in France demonstrates the French 
state‘s strong commitment to secularism. 
 Combined with general friction between native-born French citizens and 
immigrants, the secular policy framework that has characterized the French state‘s 
approach toward religion has generated a number of rhetorical clashes between French 
Muslims and their government when the former display public assertions of their 
religious identity or make demands for recognition. In March of 2017, for example, the 
European Court of Justice dismissed a complaint from a French Muslim engineer whose 
employer fired her after she refused to remove her headscarf.
54
 This ruling forms a basis 
for employers generally to restrict what types of religious symbols their employees can 
and cannot wear. The French Court of Cassation issued a ruling with similar implications 
with another French Muslim engineer was dismissed on nearly identical grounds. In this 
case, the court decided that private companies do have the right to restrict employees‘ 
religious practices, but only in instances where the employee has direct contact with 
clients and where religious restrictions are codified in writing.
55
 These types of 
restrictions highlight the inherent tension between a secular state that sees removing 
religious identity marks as a necessary step towards equality and a movement for cultural 
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recognition that sees the free display of cultural marks as a necessary condition of 
equality. 
 Of course, the conflict over what level of latitude French Muslims should have in 
the exercise of their religion does not only play out in the courts. Bans on the display of 
religious markers have also become an object of controversy in schools, with a policy 
adopted in 2004 banning the public display of religious symbols by students. In this case, 
advocates on either side of the debate cannot agree even on the scope of the controversy, 
with advocates of the policy claiming that students of all religions have quickly become 
acclimated to it and critics arguing that it continues to inflame tensions. Moreover, 
advocates of the policy have begun to argue that it should be extended to include 
additional articles of clothing and to cover parents as well as students.
56
 
The debate over what stance the French state should take towards French Muslims 
and their religious practices has formed along the fault lines of multiculturalism, making 
this civic clash a test case of how it can and cannot mesh with liberalism. In a forum on 
civic issues, French Senator  Laurence Rossignol verbalized the clashes between French 
secularism and religious revivalism in direct terms, warning that the forces of religious 
fundamentalism were threatening the foundation of French society and potentially 
undermining the ―emancipation of citizens.‖57 The senator‘s language makes specific 
reference to the sort of liberal assertions that run counter to Taylor‘s conception of 
multiculturalism, often hewing toward Kymlicka‘s conception of internal restrictions 
within groups being more in line with liberal thinking that external protections of those 
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groups. In the senator‘s remarks, the subjugation of members of minority groups, 
especially women, are identified as clear harms of allowing groups to write their own 
rules. A series of editorials in the French Press displayed the level of animosity between 
the two sides of the debate over secularism in no uncertain terms. Journalist Guy Coq 
claimed that greater recognition of religious groups by public institutions, in particular 
schools, would ―manifest not the spirit of ‗reception for each individual in himself, as a 
simple human, but the sign of the closing of each community against others.‖58 In 
response, writer Leila Sebbar described Coq‘s argument as a ―panic,‖ calling his claims 
―grotesque.‖59 Proposed bans on Burkinis on French beaches displayed in stark fashion 
the line between a type of social framework that subordinates multiculturalism to 
liberalism and one that subordinates liberalism to multiculturalism. In this case, 
advocates of the ban defended their position by claiming that they were acting in the 
interest of Muslims rather than against them, that the ban would defend the individual 
autonomy of the majority against the imposition of specific dress codes by the minority.
60
 
One French mayor even stirred up controversy by issue a veil and Burkini ban after such 
measures were struck down in court.
61
 The issue of religious freedom extended to the 
conduct of elected officials with a ban on religious garb among members of the National 
Assembly this year, which mandated that members of the assembly must wear only 
―neutral‖ garb.62 
While the strong secular tradition in France plays a major role in creating clashes 
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between French Muslims and the French state, the role of Muslim immigrants 
specifically should not be understated in discussing this issue. The movement of Muslim 
immigrants into France first stirred controversy in the 1970s and 1980s when a 
combination of economic pressure and poor housing policy created serious tensions 
between native born workers and migrants entering the country in growing numbers, 
giving ethnically-motivated nativists an opportunity to cast the issue as a threat to order 
and prosperity. Later on, this issue grew with the sense of immigrant from the Middle 
East and North Africa as a form of post-colonialism, fueling some on the left to criticize 
the government for treating migrants as second-class citizens and some on the right to 
regard immigrants with suspicion and fear.
63
 The disquiet around immigration, both as an 
economic issue and as a cultural one, has exacerbated ideological clash regarding liberal 
secularism and Islam, and that tension in itself helps to explain why the New Veil 
movement has gained a foothold in France. Demands for recognition are especially 
potent with the minority group making them sees evidence that public institutions will 
not represent them when left to their devices. As a result, the motivations based on 
expressions of personal identity and access to the public sphere would have notably 
greater force in a context like the situation in France where immigrant identity is a point 
of heated contention. 
 As in the other countries where the New Veil Movement has been studied, the 
ideological cargo associated with the veil in France differs across groups, including 
among Muslims. A study of North African Muslim women in France that even among 
those who agreed on opposition to a ban on the veil showed marked differences in how 
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they justified their positions. Younger, more educated women tended to defend the veil 
on liberal grounds, as an expression of free thought and cultural agency that the state has 
no right to regulate, while older and less educated women did not.
64
 For many, the debate 
itself on this subject represented a contested avenue of personal expression for those 
involved. Another study of French Muslims found that while views on specific policy 
provisions, varied among respondents, many expressed displeasure with a discourse that 
they felt was stifling and coercive.
65
 Some such respondents told researchers that they did 
not want their private religious views interpreted by others, while others felt that the 
political movements claiming to act in their interest treated their actual preferences 
reductively.
66
 The reaction of French Muslim women to the debate over the veil 
demonstrates the way in which the veil as a cultural symbols can become a proxy for 
cultural agency more broadly. At least for some French Muslims, the policy substance of 
the debate is subordinated to the need to define one‘s own cultural identity rather than 
adopting an identity constructed by others. The modern context of the New Veil 
movement makes the veil as an expression of individual agency an especially important 
element of the discourse. With the various cultural and political changes that have come 
to define its environment, the veil represents not just a marker of gender relations but also 
of ethno-cultural, specifically anti-colonial ideology, as well as a marker of class, as 
movements toward different modes of dress have often been led by those with the 
resources to interface with public institutions.
67
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 Looking at the progression of French law, it becomes stricter against religious 
symbols, specifically Muslim religious symbols as we near the end of 20
th
 century and 
early 21
st
 century. In 1994, ministers said that schools can in fact ban ‗ostentatious‘ 
religious signs. Shortly after, in 1995, the Conseil D‘État accepted the expulsion of three 
students wearing such ―ostentatious‖ signs, and finally, in 2004 the vote supports a ban 
on any religious symbols in schools. Within the span of a decade, the whole situation 
escalated immensely and the court system made it very clear what their stance was on the 
issues of religious attire in communal areas. Over the course of ten years, religious 
symbols became absolutely unacceptable in public schools and principals were given the 
right to protect this by the termination of any students who challenged this law. 
68
 Taking 
this into consideration, the rulings of 2009 Human Rights Court should come as no 
shock. Legislation had been steadily ruling in favor of a ban of the veil in public schools, 
and reactions had quickly become less concerned with the fundamental principles of 
secularism, but more with a fear of the other.  
 The 2009 Human Rights ruling was not without repercussions, and the 
consequences were felt on a global scale. Following the ruling, instances of racism 
increased in France as well as elsewhere in the West. Where in some cases it sparked a 
media storm, political discussions, and debate, France instead saw numerous cases of 
violence against veiled women. A 2010 newspaper article gives the account of a woman 
who was attacked, ― I felt a big blow and thought the merry-go-round had stopped. It was 
only when I saw this man saying: Now you’re respecting the law that I realized what had 
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happened—he had pulled my veil violently,” 
The veil had suddenly become an issue of human rights, and this 
unfortunately allowed French citizens to deny Muslim French women, their own people, 
the human right to freedom of religious expression. In a sense, it gave legal support and 
backing to the demonstration of racism and discrimination. Elaine Sciolino writes how 
―Westerners became sensitive to the image of faceless Muslim women largely through 
the use of the burqa by the Taliban to oppress women in Afghanistan,‖ (Sciolino, The 
New York Times) 
69
.  It is an interesting paradox because as the veil‘s presence in France 
was ―seen as a sartorial rejection of the values of the French republic,‖ it not only gave 
permission to the non Muslim French to think of Muslim French women as separate from 
the nation, but also to see the rest of the Muslim world as faceless entities that represent 
fear, oppression and terrorism. Once again the next law passed in France, however 
radical, comes to us at no surprise. 
 In April 2011, the French government banned the wearing of the full-face veil in 
public places. The irony is of course, that women who wear the full-face veil only do so 
in public and remove the veil when they are at home or in private. Although there were 
doubts about whether the law would be enforced, it created a greater sense of hostility 
towards Muslim women. Although this law was passed in order to ―protect French 
culture‖, urging ―separatist Muslims‖ to dress according to French societal norms, it 
operated just to alienate them more. The law was plainly a reaction to fear of Muslim 
radicalism spreading throughout France. It set off protests by Muslim women and men 
                                                        
69
 Sciolino, Elaine. "The French, the Veil and the Look." The New York 
Times. April 16, 2011. Accessed March 10, 2016. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/17/weekinreview/17BURQA.html?_r=0. 
 
 46 
 
throughout Paris and interestingly, ten women were reported to say‖ they started wearing 
the niqab as a response to the political controversy,‖ (Erlanger, The New York Times).70 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE NEW VEIL IN FRANCE 
Although other European and Western countries such as the United States 
did not go to such lengths as to ban the wearing of the hijab or niqab, the sentiment 
surrounding Muslim women is on par with France‘s recent political turn. In Do Muslim 
Women Need Saving? Lila Abu-Lughod introduces the idea of the Western point of view 
on Muslim women at around the same time of these issues in France. She argues that the 
United States did not pay attention to the plight of the Muslim woman until the wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. Saving Muslim women became a ―cultural and moral mission‖, 
and part of reason to go into countries like Afghanistan and Iraq. Laura Bush said, ― the 
fight against terrorism is also a fight for the rights and dignity of women.‖ 71 TIME 
magazine puts the battered face of a young Afghani girl with no nose on the cover of its 
magazine, with the headline ―What Happens if We Leave Afghanistan?” 72  This diverts 
the public‘s attention from the destruction that the United States military has caused in 
Afghanistan during its war since 2001.
73
 Although the United States and France‘s 
opposition to the veil is rooted in very different political and historic events, they both 
have, in effect, the same goal, which is to alienate Muslims from their own culture.  
 The Western media uses the burqa to portray the Muslim as an ―other‖. In Maryam 
Khalid‘s 2014 essay, ‘Gendering Orientalism’: Gender, sexuality, and race in post- 9/11 
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global politics’ ties gendered colonialist thought to the core concepts introduced in 
Edward Said‘s Orientalism. ―Otherness‖ is another way of separating the East from the 
West, an idea central in Orientalism.  Khalid reviews the Bush administration‘s tactics 
post 9/11 as ―representations of the world, drawing on stereotyped images of ‗us‘ and 
‗them‘ as ‗civilized‘ and ‗barbaric‘, and an artificial division of the world into 
‗East‘/‘West‘ and ‗good‘/‘evil‘, are made intelligible because of (historical and 
contemporary) racialized, and gendered discourses.‖ 74 The image of a woman in a burqa, 
or fully in black in a niqab juxtaposed to Holly Madison or Paris Hilton clad in a bikini is 
an example of the ―binary oppositions‖ prevalent in Western media during the Bush 
administration. The burqa was used to define a Muslim woman explicitly as an ―Other‖. 
When Western media defines Muslim women as an ―Other‖, it prevents these women 
from being able to define themselves. Their existence is only in relation to how they are 
different from the Western woman. Any attempt at this point for a Muslim woman to 
define herself falls on deaf ears as the West attempts to take control of her reality. 
 The issue takes on deeper implications when linked to the sense of fundamental 
identity that the veil embodies for many who wear it. Specifically, the veil acts in many 
circumstances as a representation of identity that complicates the liberal perspective. 
Slavoj Zizek characterizes this phenomenon as involving ―pseudo-choice.‖ That is, for 
Zizek, the very idea that a choice about wearing the veil can and should be made would 
constitute a choice to embrace or renounce a core element of certain Muslim women‘s 
cultural identity. He writes ―the moment a woman dons the veil as the result of personal 
choice, its meaning changes completely: it is no longer a sign of belonging to the Muslim 
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community, but an expression of idiosyncratic individuality.‖75 Thus, the choice to wear 
the veil is meaningful not only as a determinant of individual agency but also as a core 
element in determining what the veil itself actually represents. In Politics of Piety, Saba 
Mahmood makes a similar point, arguing that the expression and exercise of power 
involved in the decision to wear or not to wear the veil is more complex than a binary 
contrast between power and submission. She points out that eschewing the Islamic power 
structure associated with the veil often means accepting a western one, and as such the 
decision to wear the veil cannot be clearly interpreted as relinquishment of power to a 
male authority.
76
 This analysis highlights critical elements necessary to understand the 
implications of the New Veil movement in terms of ascribing societal power. That is, 
cultural symbols, including the veil, are context-specific in their meaning. In the context 
of a society where Islamic norms of piety and female modesty predominate, the decision 
to wear the veil for the most part indicates adherence to authority. Where the existing 
cultural power structure favors an opposing set of expectations however, wearing the veil 
indicates resistance to authority and an assertion of cultural independence. 
 The issue of power asymmetries plays a critical role in discussing the role of the 
New Veil movement in modern society. That is, it is on this particular dimensions that 
the New Veil movement identifies itself as clearly a reactionary and not a traditionalist 
movement. That is, the New Veil movement has come into being specifically in reaction 
to the modern formulation of secularism that has cast the veil as a sign of oppression. 
Although the movement invokes existing ideas, its emphasis on adhering to tradition 
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comes in a time and place where those traditions represent resistance to the dictates of the 
state. In this way, the New Veil movement is not a continuation of an existing cultural 
institution or even really a revival of and older institution in a meaningful sense. Rather, 
it is a distinctly modern phenomenon; without the tension between the modern secular 
state and the symbol of the veil as a fixture of Islamic ideals, the New Veil movement 
would have no reason to exist. As such, the veil in the context of the New Veil movement 
represents individual and cultural autonomy. This point becomes clearer if the specific 
connotations of the veil are set aside for the moment and the decision in question is 
considered on its own. In the context of the New Veil movement, the decision to wear the 
veil is made in opposition to established cultural forces, as a refutation of the assertion 
that Muslim women are passive and incapable of forming their own identities. 
 In Accommodating Protest Arlene Elowe Macleod gives us insight into how 
Muslim women were able to use the veil to empower themselves socially, spiritually, and 
politically in a time of economic hardship in Cairo, Egypt. Macleod points to a change in 
Muslim women‘ dress during the 1970‘s and 1980‘s; both women who did not normally 
dress conservatively to put on the veil, and a change in the function of the veil for women 
who already wore it.  Although Islamic groups in universities heavily influenced the new 
veiling movement in Cairo, it evolved into an attempt for Muslim women to change and 
interact in their society, facing issues of class, gender inequality, and colonialist 
modernity. Macleod also identifies important cultural differences between Western and 
Islamic values that shape women‘s roles in society.  Western values and the early 
feminist movement celebrate the advent of the ―working woman‖, who sheds her 
domestic duties for a career. A woman is no longer defined by her family, but as an 
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individual in the workplace, as is a Western man. Islam values family and community 
over individualism. So the necessity for Muslim women to leave the house to work is due 
to financial stress, and work is not seen as an outlet in which to shape ones sense of self. 
But it was a reality that Muslim women were leaving the house to work, and putting on 
the veil was a way for them to be taken seriously at their job and be respected. This very 
act of wearing a form of ―armor‖ to work was not specific to Egypt, but was happening in 
Western fashion as well. This use of the veil is analogous to Western women wearing 
pantsuits with shoulder pads to make them look more masculine, sending a subconscious 
symbol to the other men in the office. Macleod does acknowledge that for some women, 
the veil was purely symbolic of their faith, but also that the new veil provided ―a new 
way to be a woman in changing Cairo.‖ 77The veil is a bridge between modern and 
traditional values in Cairo because it ―provides a sense of continuity and security in what 
have become controversial culture decisions. These cultural and social connotations seem 
more important than purely religious feelings.‖78  
 Issues surrounding veiling in the 1980‘s were not localized in only France and 
Egypt. In 1983 female students were banned from their university in Turkey because they 
were wearing headscarves.  Although the veil‘s significance was unique to the 
complicated social and political history of secularism in Turkey, we can find similar 
threads of symbolism looking at this movement. In The Forbidden Modern, the author 
urges us to look at the veiling movement as a social movement and as the major source of 
conflict between secularists and Islamists in Turkey. The veil is so divisive because of its 
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association with women‘s rights, as women wearing the veil are seen as submissive, thus 
representing the revival of Islamism. Yet in order to understand the new veiling 
movement in Turkey, according to the author Nilifur Gole, it is necessary to look at the 
―local constructs of Western modernity in which women have an edificatory role‖.79  
With the rise of Kemalism, Turkey‘s branch of secularism, which focused on shedding 
―alla turka‖, Eastern traditions for Western ones, the veil was no longer accepted as 
suitable for the ―modern‖ woman. The word modern becomes associated automatically 
with Western or European, and the values that come along with it. With an emphasis on 
women‘s visible role in society, Kamalism encouraged what Islam prohibited; the mixing 
of genders in public spaces and displays of public affection such as holding hands, tight 
European-fitting clothes (and a figure to match) over loose fitting ones, and a general 
sense of bringing what was private and sacred in women, their ―mahrem‖ to the public 
sphere. So the natural conflicting questions surrounding women and their sexuality in 
Turkey are more about  ―critical dependence of modernity‖ rather than loyalty to Islamic 
religion.  Like Macleod, the author seems to think that the veil is more of a sociopolitical 
issue rather than a religious one.  
 The new veiling in Turkey was called ―the turban movement”.  This term turban, 
as Gole explains, differentiates itself from the term used to describe the traditional 
headscarf.  Such distinction is inherently symbolic of how this is a new movement, and 
not just a return to traditional ways. In Turkey, a country that embraced values of 
Western modernity, but used it to promote its own nationalism, all the while maintaining 
a Muslim majority, defining identity is tricky. The new veiling movement for Muslim 
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women ―represents the public and collective affirmation of women who are searching for 
recognition of their Muslim identity through its expression—that is, through Islamism.‖ 
80
  Putting on the headscarf at this time is an active political re-appropriation versus a 
passive custom, which was passed down by their mother over generations. The veiled 
students, educated by the secularist education system, are self-empowered and they 
combine their knowledge of Islam with their knowledge of history and politics. With 
women‘s involvement with Islamism through the new veil, comes female empowerment 
and some critique of Islamist ideology, provoking ―disorder in Islamic gender definitions 
and identities.‖81 Therefore, as is the case with Egypt, the new veil allows women to 
become more visible as an individual, but at the same time, become part of a the 
collective identity, challenging women‘s role in both Westernized ―modernity‖ and 
traditional Islamism.  
 The new veiling movement was present in the United States, more notably after 
the 9/11 terror attacks, when tensions surrounding Muslims were high. Leila Ahmed 
describes Annia Raja, a student at University of Texas who, ―taken up the hijab after 9/11 
precisely as a way of ‗negating‘ the wide spread stereotypes about the hijab and 
Muslims.‖ Ahmed finds most interesting how Raja used the term ―liberated‖ to describe 
how the veil made her feel.  This is an example of someone embracing such the 
―otherness‖ of her religion, symbolized by the hijab, and reutilizing it as a liberating 
display of her identity. Again in Leila Ahmed‘s accounts, we see the same terminology of 
the veil making women visible, instead of covering or shielding them, and that ―wearing 
hijab had given her strength and had made her visible not only to the majority community 
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but also to the handful of the women in hijab she saw on her way to work.‖ In this case, it 
was not just a personal sense of liberation that Raja gained by wearing the hijab, but also 
a sense of inclusion of a larger community and a powerful connection with strangers.  
Leila Ahmed compares the new veiling in Egypt and America, saying that in ―Cairo, it 
was resistance to mainstream society‘s perceived materialism and corruption, in America 
it was resistance to perceived discrimination and prejudice and to being seen as 
―terrorists,‖. One could make the argument that the new veiling movement in Turkey, 
was a resistance to imposed Kemalism in every day society.  The underlying link 
between all three as we start to look at France is best said by another American Muslim 
Ahmed quoted in her book, ― I am an educated Muslim woman in the West, and even 
though I have no idea what‘s its like to be an Iraqi, Bosnian, Somalian, or Palestinian, I 
know that we share an identity through Islam and through the hijab.‖ With the outbreak 
of social media, and world wide connectivity, the veil can no longer be seen as a local 
issue in certain Western or non Western countries, but that the new veiling has global 
power, with the hijab as its ―sign and banner of a call for justice.‖ 82 
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CONCULSION 
 
 Considering the history of legislation in France, it is undeniable that the Muslim 
woman has been forced to choose to whether she wants her public identity to be French 
or Muslim.  We looked at how Western media portrayed veiled Muslim women as the 
―Other‖ and how Muslim women in countries like Egypt, Turkey, and the United States 
have then turned to use that otherness to spark a ―Quiet Revolution‖, as Leila Ahmed 
calls it. It would make sense that a new veiling movement in France could occur, as the 
veil is so intricately woven into society‘s current politics and secularist history.  
Eventually, we look at France with anticipation, if these laws continue at the rate they 
seem to be moving at, will it not only provoke more ―new veilings‖ in France? How are 
these laws effective? In Politics of the Veil, Scott describes the Levy sisters, unique 
because these women were not originally Muslim, but recently converted. For these 
sisters, the decision to convert ―seems to have been an individual one, contrary to the 
explanations offered by those who sought to ban the foulard in order to liberate women 
from the control of Islamist men.‖83 Based on this research, I would predict that there will 
be more and more stories like this, if there aren‘t already are, in France. In societies that 
have fought so hard for their own ―branch‖ of secularism like France, secularism in turn 
becomes a generator for fundamentalism.  
 The types of social classes that have sprung up around the New Veil movement 
should serve as an indication that liberalism in its purest form is insufficient to establish a 
workable multicultural society. That is, if reformers hoping to construct public 
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institutions such that they foster meaningful cooperation treat each individual separately, 
group identities will reassert themselves through oppositional avenues. Rather than 
attempting to study these sorts of reactions as backsliding towards antiquated norms and 
attempting to govern by suppressing them, researchers and policymakers should work to 
construct institutions around them. The exact structure of those institutions will vary from 
one society to the next. Muslims who ascribe to the New Veil movement in Egypt have 
different needs than those who ascribe to the movement in France. Even so, the need for 
recognition of groups and guarantees of free agency in constructing cultural identities 
should be treated as a element of working public institutions that should be reflected 
across multiple states. 
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